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JAN-MAR 70

S.D. 55

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
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DX 1

Sandy Coordinator

16 JAN 1970

SAR Effort Report (Boxer 22 Alpha and Bravo)



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General Situation:

a. (S) A SAR effort was conducted on 5, 6, 7 December 1969 for Boxer 22 Alpha and Bravo. Boxer 22, an F-4 A/C based at Cam Ranh Bay RVN, had received battle damage on a bomb run in his target area, four miles South of D-30 085°/63/89. The battle damage was of such a severe nature to cause the pilot and radar operator to eject immediately. This action set the stage for a SAR effort which was very close to the main trail Route 23 and in an area of maximum AAA defense. This area could be expected to yield heavy small arms up to 37mm reaction.

b. (S) The prominent terrain features in the SAR area WE 775365, are contained in the 600 feet MSL NAM-NGO river valley, with 500 feet high karst on either side of the river. The karst on the west side was approximately 250 meters from Alpha's position. On the east side karst formations are more numerous and closer to the river, approximately 150 meters. The ground on both sides adjacent to the river is very rough, covered with scrub trees, bushes, and occasional bamboo thickets, and did not afford maximum protection or desirable E&E situation for the survivors. Weather throughout the SAR area was clear and not a detriment. Surface winds were less than ten knots from the east.

Specific Details Concerning The SAR Effort

5 December 1969

1. (S) On 5 December, at 1030 local time, the Command Post was informed by Blue Chip that Boxer 22 Alpha and Bravo had ejected South of D-30 area and requested four Vodkas (CBU 19/30) A/C be uploaded ASAP. The two Jolly Greens 09, 37 and Sandys 01 thru 04 were scrambled. Nail 14 was in the SAR area and was On-Scene-Commander.

2. (S) On arrival, Sandy 01 assumed the role of On-Scene-Commander after being briefed by Nail 14 and King. Sandy 01 had visual contact with both chutes and voice contact with Alpha and Bravo. Alpha reported troops within 15 meters of his position. Sandy 01 and 02 strafed and dropped CBU-14 near both of the survivors. Heavy ground fire was observed from several locations, mainly from the base of the

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karst which surrounded the location of the survivors. Sandy 01 instructed Mail 14 to put in the available fast movers to neutralize the four 37MM gun positions in the northern sector. Sandy 01 utilized another flight of fast movers with 20MM to strike a 23MM position in a cave southeast of the survivors' positions. Sandy 01 and 02 also placed CBU and rockets around the area on several successive passes and no ground fire was reported or observed.

3. (S) Sandy 01 decided to attempt a pickup using the available 15 smoke bombs (M-46) to screen the known gun positions. These positions had not fired since being attacked. Jolly Green 09 was briefed and started in for the pickup, Sandy 01 and 02 dropped screening smoke bombs. Jolly Green 09 developed radio difficulties and was unable to communicate with the Sandys. The smoke faded rapidly exposing Jolly Green 09 to heavy ground fire and the pickup was aborted.

4. (S) Sandy 01 regrouped his forces including the recently arrived A-1 aircraft carrying Vodka and proceeded to brief for another pickup attempt. In the meantime, both slow and fast mover's ordnance was placed on known and suspected gun positions. The ground fire subsided and Sandy 01 decided to use the available Vodka and smoke as a screen around the survivors. Ordnance was well placed, but the timing was a bit off and as Jolly Green 37 moved in the ground fire became prohibitive and the attempted pickup was abandoned.

5. (S) Sandy 01 turned the On-Scene-Command over to Sandy 03. Sandy 03 extended the ordnance on suspected gun areas from several flights of slow movers. He used WP bombs to screen off the 23MM position and then directed Jolly Green 76 in for an attempted pickup. This attempt was aborted when Jolly Green 76 began receiving ground fire on the approach. The PJ was seriously wounded and subsequently was DOW at Channel 89. As Sandy 05 and 06 arrived, Sandy 03 briefed them on the situation and available resources and then relinquished On-Scene-Command to the new crews.

6. (S) Sandy 05 and 06 made several low passes over the area and located both the survivors' chutes. Sandy 05 and 06 also observed the karst cliffs and the numerous caves, concealed by brush and trees, which housed both 23/37MM gun positions. It appeared that the gun locations would not permit the muzzles of these AAA weapons to be depressed low enough to hit a low flying aircraft.

7. (S) The pickup plan was devised and briefed to bring Jolly Green 79 in from the north, dropping quickly to the river and then heading south to the area of the survivors for a quick pickup. Alpha and Bravo, both approximately 10 meters from the river, understood and were prepared to dash to the river at the correct moment. Jolly

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Green 79 would be afforded the protection of the 10-12 feet high river banks and the daisy-chain of slow movers to counter the active small arms/AAA positions. The Jolly Green 79's protection was four Vodka and Sandy 05 and 06. Ordnance available was WP M-47, CBU, rockets and 20MM.

8. (S) Jolly Green 79 started his run to the east-southeast but turned north instead of south and lost his fighter screen. The 37MM to the north of the survivors began shooting and hit Jolly Green 79.

9. (S) The A-1s escorted Jolly Green 79 out of the area and over a protective karst formation, then returned to base (RTB) for a safe landing.

10. (S) Sandy 05 then brought in Jolly Green 69 with an escort of Sandy 07 and 08 for an attempted pickup using the same plan as briefed for Jolly Green 79. While spiraling down over the pre-briefed safe area in preparation for a run-in toward Route 23, the helicopter speed and turning radius prevented taking advantage of terrain masking and Jolly Green 69 received heavy fire from 23MM and 37MM guns located in the P-30 area. Jolly Green 69 was hit and the entire aft section was aflame as it headed northwest toward Channel 89 with A-1 escort.

11. (S) Sandy 07 assumed the On-Scene-Command, ordered maximum radio discipline and instructed all aircraft to clear the area and to set up orbit points. Sandy 07 received a briefing from King on available forces and from Sandy 05 on the tactical situation. It was still apparent that much work was required if the heavy AAA guns were to be put out of commission.

12. (S) Sandy 07 requested Paveway/GAM ordnance from King. Difficulties in achieving lock-on with the guided bomb avionics was time consuming; however, several impacts were scored before the F-4 flight commander decided at about 1645L that his equipment was not functioning well enough to continue the GAM strikes.

13. (S) Sandy 07 ordered numerous A-1 strikes against the gun caves. Firefly 30/31 delivered effective napalm and CBU-14 against a particularly deadly gun in the northeastern end of the valley. Other flights expended MK-82 bombs, CBU-14, rockets and 20MM throughout the valley. Since sunset was at 1728L, Sandy 07 transmitted a timetable for the rescue attempt which was to be made at 1715L.

14. (S) Sandy 07 divided the working area into three north-south segments and assigned Sandy 05, Nail 29, and Nail 35 to control continuous strikes in the segments. During this time King made available several flights of fast mover aircraft for use by these Nails. Sandy

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07/08 placed M-47 white phosphorous bombs (WP) to divide these sectors of responsibility and to screen the center sector from the heavy fire of 37MM gun positions near D-30 and D-35. While the Nails directed ordnance within their sectors, Sandy 07 continued to direct ordnance in the center sector near the survivor.

15. (S) According to the plan, CBU-19 was expended at 1712L, three minutes before the intended pickup. Smoke and CBU-14 were simultaneously delivered at the base of the karst all around the valley. Sandy 07 directed Sandy 09/10 to bring the Jolly Greens from the holding point to the west into the survivor's area on a heading of 090°. The run-in was delayed because the helicopters and A-1s became separated. When Sandy 07 first saw Jolly Green 72 the helicopter was well to the north of the survivor's position in an area where Jolly Green 69 had taken 37MM fire. Sandy 07 immediately ordered Jolly Green 72 to head south, but the helicopter was hit from gunfire which came from several positions in the northern part of the valley. Sandy 08 called that Sandy 07 was being fired upon by 23MM positions in caves at the base of a steep karst just southeast of the survivors. Both Sandy 07/08 were bracketed by gunfire from multiple AAA positions. Sandy 07 was hit in the engine accessory section. Both he and Sandy 08 fired rockets and 20MM into the 23MM AAA positions but were unable to silence them. It was now dusk and Sandy 07 directed all SAR forces to clear the valley. Jolly Green 72 returned to base successfully.

16. (S) The tactical situation was such that considerably more silencing of guns would be necessary before another attempt could be made. Sandy 07 advised King that the effort should be terminated for the night. King agreed at 1755L that the forces should return to base.

17. (S) The survivors requested the Sandys remain overhead long enough to allow them to bed down for the night. Boxer 22 Alpha had compromised his position when he lit his smoke flare. King suggested the possibility of the survivors inflating their life vests and floating down stream. Sandy 07 advised against this because of the possibility of water damage to the RT-10 radios and also because of troops near a ford just downstream of the survivors' positions. Sandy 07 began experiencing engine problems, so he and Sandy 08 returned to base. Spad 11 and 12 remained in the area to cover the survivors until after darkness.

6 December 1969

18. (S) A first light effort was generated on 6 December. In keeping with practice, the Sandys on scene at Last Light launched at 0545Z and arrived in the area just before sunrise. Mission prebriefing included a change in the tactical plan whereby the Jolly Green holding pattern was moved to the east of the survivor over an ENE karst

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area. A-1 strikes and CBU 19/30 (Shotgun) aircraft were briefed to hold west. During the early morning, the following information was received from Higher Headquarters; "Indications from a usually reliable intelligence source indicated the NVN are setting up a flak trap at an unknown location. This flak trap is designed for low flying aircraft, Heli's and C-130's, and is related to the SAR effort of Foxer 22 Alpha and Bravo." This information was briefed to flight crews prior to their takeoff.

19. (S) On arrival, Sandy 01 contacted Nail 21 who had already established voice contact with Foxer 22 Bravo. Evidence subsequently given by Foxer 22 Bravo indicated that Alpha was surrounded soon after sunrise. According to the plan, Nail 0V-10 aircraft were assigned sectors and began to FAC strike aircraft which systematically saturated the entire valley floor and surrounding karst with a variety of ordnance. This outstanding effort by Nail 21 was continued for over five hours. Several flights of A-1 Firefly, Hobo, Zorro, and Spads also expended.

20. (S) Sandy 01 requested Paveway/GAM ordnance from King and these weapons were given priority in attacks on the karst from which key 23MM fire had been received the night before. These numerous caves were progressively destroyed by excellent ordnance delivery.

21. (S) During mid-morning, Foxer 22 Bravo reported gunfire from troops on the west bank of the river. He also reported troops attempting to cross to his side. Sandy 01 directed Nail 21 to have the river strafed to discourage this. CBU 19/30 (Shotgun) was also requested and was laid on the west bank over the enemy troops led by Shotgun 40/41. Numerous other Shotgun A-1s made repeated low, 200 foot, passes down the valley floor. Enemy troops made no further efforts to cross the river during the morning.

22. (S) During the morning hours, heavy 37MM and automatic weapons reaction were experienced before the strike ordnance progressively silenced these positions. Nail 21 was repeatedly attacked. Sandy 02 was bracketed by two clips of 37MM fire from the D-35 area and both Sandy 01/02 received fire from 37MM positions west of D-30 whenever terrain masking was not possible.

23. (S) Foxer 22 Bravo reported that all Shotgun aircraft were subjected to small arms and automatic weapons fire as they made their low-level passes down the valley along Route 23.

24. (S) Before turning over the On-Scene-Command to Sandy 07, Sandy 01 and 02 expended rockets to mark the southern gun positions that had fired the night before. The Nails then directed additional strikes on these positions.

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25. (S) Sandy 01 briefed Sandy 07 on the active targets and turned over On-Scene-Command at 1115L. Boxer 22 Bravo reported troop movements from the west side of the river in the vicinity of Boxer 22 Alpha's parachute, so Sandy 07 elected to strafe the west bank. After two strafe passes, no further movement was reported. During the strafe passes, the 2300 gun position to the east continued to fire, so Nail 21 directed additional Paveway bombs on this gun.

26. (S) At approximately 1200L, the gunfire was apparently silenced, and Sandy 07 briefed his forces on the pickup attempt. Six A-1 Shotgun loaded aircraft and Spad 13 and 14 with CRU-22 smoke were available. The plan was for the Shotgun flight to lay CRU-19/30 in two north-south strips, one on the west side of the river, the other on the east; then two Spads would lay CRU-22 smoke on top of the gas strips. Sandy 09 had Jolly Green 72 in position to the southeast, and Sandy 07 brought the Jolly in as the smoke was being out down on the west side. Jolly Green 72 hovered for 1-2 minutes while the survivor fired the night end of his flare. Sandy 07 observed the Jolly Green to be 10 meters north of the survivor and directed the Jolly Green to move south. At this time Jolly Green 72 reported small arms fire from the west bank of the river and exited to the south receiving small arms damage.

27. (S) The smoke screen was still in effect and Sandy 07 decided to try again with Jolly 77 after two CRU runs on the west bank. Jolly 77 hovered for 3-5 minutes in the area of Boxer 22 Bravo's parachute but could not locate the survivor. He struck a tree with the main rotor, damaging all five blade tips, and was forced to exit the area with heavy vibration and rotor head damage. This attempt terminated at approximately 1220 hours. Boxer 22 Bravo later stated he could have been picked up if he had been in a more favorable location. His position was at the base of a 10 foot dropoff on the river bank, and the Jolly Green was hovering above the bank. Boxer 22 Bravo had no day smoke flares remaining, which complicated the job of pinpointing his exact position.

28. (S) At 1225L, Sandy 07 attempted to fire his marking rockets, but was unsuccessful due to a malfunction. As Sandy 08 attempted to mark, he was hit by 3700 fire from the north and RTR'd with heavy battle damage to the left wing. Sandy 07 turned over On-Scene-Command to Sandy 11 at 1230L and 5R.

29. (S) Since Jolly Green 76 received a small amount of ground fire, Sandy 11 on the pickup attempt planned to use the same basic plan and had only to wait for resources to arrive. Sandy 11 requested four aircraft with CRU-22 and in the meantime began putting in flights with CRU-11.

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30. (S) Nail FMCs on scene were also used in putting in fast movers to the south and later to the north. After Sandy 13 had arrived, Sandy 11 discussed the plan with King, and was advised that only two aircraft carrying CBU-22 were arriving within the hour. Sandy 11 decided that since the last attempt had been almost successful, he would use M-47's and not wait any longer as the area was beginning to cloud over.

31. (S) Sandy 11 briefed everyone involved on what they were to do and set the plan in motion. It seemed to be working very well until Jolly Green 68 overshot the survivor and didn't hear instructions from Sandy 11. After hovering for 2-3 minutes and finally getting over the survivor's position, he called ground fire and exited the area.

32. (S) Sandy 11 briefed Sandy 13 thoroughly on the tactical situation and turned over On-Scene-Command to him. In taking stock of the resources available to him, Sandy 13 found that he had four flights of Shotgun aircraft, each loaded with CBU-30, CBU-14, and 20MM. In the meantime, Sandy 15 and 16 had also arrived in the area and had picked up the next flight of Jolly Greens 03 and 19, to the east. Sandy 13 briefed Sandy 15 on the ingress route, which would be the same as on the previous attempt. Sandy 13 then called King and requested more CBU-22. He felt that this was particularly valuable, since the survivor had said that Jolly Green 68 had not taken ground fire until the southern part of the screen around him had dissipated. King stated that no flights of CBU-22 were then airborne, and that he did not have a firm ETA on these aircraft. Sandy 13 was forced to consider the possibility of attempting a pickup using CBU-30 for screening. Thus, he brought Shotgun 62, 64, and 66 flights into the area, marked, and described how he wanted the CBU-30 dispensed should it be needed.

33. (S) Shotgun 68 flight was to remain high and slightly to the west in case his flight was needed to fill holes or re-lay a side of the screen. Then King called to say that another CBU-22 flight would be available, but that it had just taken off from Channel 89. Sandy 13 then decided to wait for the CBU-22 and use it for the southwest leg of the triangle he planned to create, still using Shotgun for the northwestern and eastern legs. King notified Sandy 13 of the availability of a flight of three F-4s with BUU-52 and asked Sandy to come up on a discrete frequency for briefing.

34. (S) Sandy 13 called the Sandy and Jolly forces over to that frequency, and a briefing was conducted. It was decided to use this ordnance on karst formations to the northwest and northeast and to turn over the task of putting in the fast movers to Nail 21. The ordnance was scheduled to go in just prior to laying a smoke screen

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for another pickup attempt. Then Sandy 13 learned that yet another A-1 flight of CRU-22 had just become airborne and with its arrival would obviate the need for CRU-30. The plan was altered slightly to time the laying down of BUU-52 by Boxer 33 flight and the laying down of smoke screen by the A-1 flights.

35. (S) In the meantime, however, all had not been quiet in the area of the survivor. Boxer 22 Bravo reported on Guard Channel saying he was receiving mortar fire from a karst to the east. Sandy 13 used Shotgun 62 flight's CRU-14 to silence that position. When the survivor then called activity on the road to his east, Sandy 13 and Boxer 68 flight rolled in to suppress that threat. The survivor reported he was receiving small arms fire from the west bank of the river, near Alpha's parachute. Sandy 13 also cleared the Shotgun flights to strike the area near Alpha's last known position with CRU-14 and COMM.

36. (S) A little later, about ten minutes prior to laying smoke for the next pickup attempt, Bravo called enemy troops within ten meters of his position. Sandy 13 then cleared Sandy 14 and Shotgun 64 and 68 flights to strafe within 10 meters of the survivor's parachute. The five A-1s did a magnificent job and the next call from the survivor was that all the enemy had been killed. A few minutes later Sandy 13 cleared the Mail to begin expending the BUU-52 and turned his attention to briefing the CRU-22 flights for the smoke screen.

37. (S) As the Mail had almost completed his mission, Sandy 13 called for the Jolly Green to begin an ingress and for the smoke screen to be laid, with the unwind side to be laid last by Hobo 56. The Spad and Hobo flights did their work effectively, but Sandy 13 had underestimated the volume of smoke and the strength of the wind. As a result, he had difficulty finding Jolly Green 03 and the area immediately over the survivor was fast becoming IFR. Finally, he found Jolly Green and gave him two vectors before he disappeared into the smoke. It was then impossible for Sandy 13 to tell how close the Jolly Green was to the survivor, for he could see neither the survivor nor the helicopter.

38. (S) The smoke was blowing very quickly, and within a minute or two the area of the survivor and to his south began to clear. Jolly Green 03 then began to call small arms fire and that he was coming out. Sandy 13 could see that he was directly over the survivor and called this information to him. Jolly Green 03 remained in place and Sandy 13 called for the Hobo flight to lay the remainder of its smoke to the south and southwest, the only flank of Jolly Green 03 that was exposed.

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39. (S) The Hobos did this very quickly, but in the meantime Jolly Green 19, the high helicopter, came up on Guard calling Mayday and saying that he had been hit. Every frequency then became unreadable with chatter and Jolly Green 03 pulled out. The attempted pickup was irretrievably lost. Sandy 13, below bingo fuel and with only a little CBU-14 remaining, called in Sandy 17 to take over On-Scene-Command. Sandy 13 made one last pass to expend the remainder of his CBU, briefed Sandy 17 and exited the area to the west with Sandy 14.

40. (S) Sandy 17, was now the On-Scene-Commander. At this time the situation could be described as tight, being complicated by the fact that sunset was less than an hour away and previous rescue attempts had required considerably more time to organize prior to execution than had been anticipated.

41. (S) Sandy 17 quickly issued instructions to the new set of Jolly Greens and to their Sandy escort, being very explicit in his description of the entry corridor, entry timing, exit routes marking their entire route with WP rockets, thereby making their arrival at the rescue site precisely as had been directed by Sandy 17.

42. (S) Prior to vectoring in the Jolly Green, Sandy 17 who was making repeated low passes under heavy ground fire in order to survey the scene, directed A-1 strikes against the known gun positions. He also timed CBU 14/19/22/30 runs so that the entire rescue scene would be blanketed for a safe entry of the chopper. The Jolly Green entry took place as darkness fell. Four Sandys and four A-1 CBU 19/30 aircraft formed a daisy chain around him as he moved in.

43. (S) During the run-in, a 37MM two kilometers to the west began shooting but was immediately silenced by one of the strike aircraft. Another 37MM position to the northeast fired at aircraft which strayed out of the daisy chain or flew over the karst to the northeast.

44. (S) Gunfire was observed from positions higher in the karsts surrounding the scene and most of these were attacked. One A-1 was hit by 37MM fire from the site northeast of the survivor.

45. (S) Timing was very critical in this operation. The reason for aborting this pickup attempt was the delay in getting the Jolly Green over the survivor. This delay exposed the Jolly Green too long to ground fire. Additionally, intense 20MM and rocket fire from the A-1 aircraft may have been mistakenly identified as hostile ground fire by the Jolly Green crew. The eight A-1 A/C continued their attack, covering the safe retreat of the Jolly Greens. Impending darkness and much smoke clearly contributed to the problem of orientation. The survivor was advised to bed down for the night and a Nail or King would be overhead listening all night.

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46. (S) After briefing the SAR forces on planned actions Sandy 01/02 took off at 0520L and proceeded directly to the last known location of survivor, Boxer 22B. Nail 24 had preceded Sandy 01/02 flight to the scene and had established radio contact with Boxer 22B. He was requesting ordnance on his old position, since he had moved and detected enemy movement in his previous area. Sandy 01 made a CBU-14 pass from east to west across the old location under the cover of Sandy 02. No further movement was noted in the area after this event. The next order of business was to precisely locate the survivor's position and then insure the ordnance was placed upon all the known gun positions in the immediate area. After pointing out the survivor's position and the location of the AAA emplacements, Nail 24 was given the task of controlling and directing the "fast mover" resources. Nail 24's performance during this period was outstanding.

47. (S) Repeated low passes in the area by Sandy 01 and 02 did not stimulate an inordinate amount of enemy ground fire. Sandy 01 then proceeded to brief the A-1 "Fruit" (CBU-19/30) flights and A-1 aircraft carrying smoke. After this, the JG pilots and Sandy 03/04 were given a detailed briefing on the sequence of events and Sandy 03 was given an orientation run on the desired ingress route.

48. (S) All phases of the initial portion of the plan were executed with precision. As the helicopters were moved in close to the I.P. they were instructed to go to Guard Channel. JG 17, the low helicopter could not be contacted on guard and therefore it required the rescue effort be made with the SAR forces on FM radio. This caused a small disruption in the timing of the plan. The move into the area was smooth and the JG was directed into a position directly over the survivor. At this time JG 77 said he could not see because of the smoke, was receiving excessive ground fire, and was pulling out. All SAR resources were withdrawn from the immediate area and the new Sandy low lead was given a thorough briefing on the situation.

49. (S) Sandy 07/08 had ground briefed extensively on the situation and at 0800 local time were scrambled to replace Sandy 03/04. After arriving on the scene and with the original forces regrouped in a safe area, Sandy 01 briefed Sandy 07 as to the exact location of Boxer 22B, and the suspected location of enemy ground troops plus a new threat, a truck mounted AAA gun. At 0930 Local time Sandy 07 relieved Sandy 01 as low element lead. Nails 38, 18, and 46 were asked to FAC in all the fast movers ordnance available for sanitizing the SAR area. The mounted AAA gun threat was quickly eliminated. While these FACs were working, King 4 and Sandy 07 began to marshal their forces for another rescue attempt. Meanwhile, JG 77/76 rendezvoused with King for air refueling.

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50. (S) King 4 advised that Manual flight would be on scene at 1030L, that Fruit flights 46-55 would arrive about 1015L, and that a Boxer flight (with CBU-52) would arrive at 1050L. The plan was to utilize Manual flight to the west of the survivor and the Fruit flight to the east in a coordinated effort to seal off the survivor for a rescue by Jolly Green 77. Boxer flight, with CBU 52, was to sanitize an area northeast of the survivor which had given the previous rescue attempt problems with SA/AV fire. As it turned out Boxer flight was never used, but the area was struck by other flights controlled by a Nail PAC. At approximately 1045L Spad 12/13 joined forces with the Fruit flight to the east. King 4 then advised that Manual flight was on station but had only two aircraft available with about 10 minutes of strike time. Since King 4 had mentioned that strike aircraft, Firefly 56/57; Zorro 12/13; Hobo 32/33 were on their way to the rescue scene, Warty 07 decided to alter the original plan and have the slow mover strike aircraft handle the west side of the survival area.

51. (S) The tactical plan was to use two coordinated daisy chain attacks: One on the east side of the survivor and one on the west side. The primary objective of these attacks was to lay down a smoke screen plus CBU 19/30 and at the same time deliver ordnance to keep any small arms/automatic weapons from firing. Hopefully, all the big guns were to be silenced by fast mover heavy ordnance.

52. (S) All the SAR forces were assembled and briefed; they moved into position at about 1140L and went to work. Just as soon as the smoke bombs developed Jolly Green 77 was called in to make the rescue pickup attempt.

53. (S) Luck held and the wind died down, the A-1s laid their ordnance precisely on their respective targets, the smoke held its designed shape and a screen was formed. The screen was effective long enough to allow JG 77 to make a successful rescue and return to a safe area by the same route he had entered.

54. (S) The survivor, Boxer 228, Lt Bergeron, was in relatively good condition considering he spent some 51 hours in an extremely active M&E situation. His determination, stamina, resourcefulness and luck all played a major part in his rescue. Boxer 228 is missing in action.

55. (S) The determined aggressiveness and extreme heroism exhibited by all SAR forces are of special note. The difficulties encountered in overcoming the elements and enemy defenses in the survivor's location was almost beyond imagination. The lessons learned should not be forgotten. The listed organizations shared equal pride in the accomplishment of a job well done.

- a. The members of the 56th Special Operations wing.
- b. 40 ARRS
- c. 23rd TASS

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- d. King A/C
- e. Numerous Fast Movers
- f. Control Agencies

Albert S. Martin

ALBERT S. MARTIN, Lt Col, USAF
Sandy Coordinator

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1. 56th SOW SAR Mission Summary
2. Participants on 5 Dec 1969
3. Participants on 6 Dec 1969
4. Participants on 7 Dec 1969
5. SAR Area Large Scale
6. SAR Area Small Scale
7. Alpha & Bravo Ground Location
8. Typical Terrain Features
9. CBU (Smoke) Being Laid as a screen
10. Developed Smoke Screen
11. Dissipating Smoke Screen

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56th SOW SAR MISSION SUMMARY

A/C CALLSIGN - Boxer 22 A&B TYPE - F-4C LOCATION - BAN PHAN HQP LAOS TIME - 1025L 5 DEC 69

HQ/STATION - Cam Ranh Bay

FORCES GENERATED

SANDY 48
CBU 88
JOLLY GREEN 28
SPADS 14
OTHERS A-1=39, NAIL=25
TOTAL 242
TOTAL A-1= 189

FORCES FLOWN

SANDY 44
CBU 80
JOLLY GREEN 24
SPADS 8
OTHERS A-1=39, NAIL=25
TOTAL 220
TOTAL A-1 A-1= 171

TIME OF PICKUP 1152L BY JG77

7 DEC 69

CREWMEMBER CONDITION A=MIA

B=GOOD

REMARKS: 1 P.J. killed in action

12 A-1's Battle Damage

Largest Wing SAR effort on record.

The A-1, Jolly Green and Nail forces who participated in the SAR effort on

5 December are as follows:

SANDY 01 - George	VODKA 44 - Andersen
02 - Preyss	45 - Porter
03 - Rounce	46 - Combs
04 - Bender	47 - Friestad
05 - Doneau	48 - Leonhardt
06 - Kantrud	49 - Miller, W.
07 - Tripp	50 - Frisbie
08 - Knox	51 - Coleman
09 - Dayton	52 - Castagno
10 - Dyer	53 - Bertrand
J.G. 37 - Hoilman	54 - Monroe
17 - Pfanschmidt	55 - Chorlins
72 - Shipman	STRIKE FF 24 - Williams, P.
76 - Carty	25 - Costin
NAIL 06 - Ouellett	HOBO 10 - Pohl
13 - Coffin	11 - Doolittle
14 - Harman/Deleo	12 - Moffatt
35 - James	13 - Ware
29 - Risinger	FF 26 - Lowman
12 - Leard/Post	27 - Whinery
VODKA 40 - Gable	ZORRO 50 - Williams, A.
41 - Wylie	51 - Hanna
42 - Homan	FF 30 - Hudson
43 - Cavender	31 - Matthews

The A-1, Jolly Green and Nail forces who participated in the SAR effort on
6 December are as follows:

SANDY 01 - Tripp	J.G. 76 Sanderson
02 - Rounce	72 Catlin
03 - Deneau	77 Schickerman
04 - Kantrud	19 Holiman
05 - Lowman	03 Prouse
06 - Matthews	27 Loomis
07 - Hudson	68 Smith
08 - Wylie	17 Pfranschmidt
09 - Dayton	15 Butchka
10 - Dyer	07 Barnes
11 - George	FAC-NAIL 38 - Warden
12 - Whinery	21 - White
13 - Castagno	13 - Coffin
14 - Pohl	12 - Leard
15 - Novak	52 - Smith
16 - Hoffman	14 - Harmon
17 - Monk	41 - Ryan
18 - Preyss	19 - Hurt
19 - Combs	28 - Janes
20 - Williams, P.	31 - Hoffman
21 - Lowman	
22 - Matthews	

VODKA 56 - Driscoll

57 - Maloney

58 - Brown

59 - Bolstad

60 - Monk

61 - Johann

62 - Costin

63 - Williams, P.

~~SPAD 11~~ - Detar

12 - Coleman

ICBO 56 - Tarnowski

57 - Townsend

ZORRO 12 - Driscoll

13 - Bolstad

SHOTGUN 40 - Gable

41 - Marzano

42 - Homan

43 - Cavender

44 - Gardner.

45 - Townsend

46 - Frisbie

47 - Monroe

48 - Andersen

49 - Porter

50 - Bischoff

51 - McAuliffe

52 - Knox

53 - Bender

54 - Friestad

55 - Walter

56 - Driscoll

57 - McNeil

58 - Brown

59 - Maloney

~~60 - Huntsman~~

61 - Diller

62 - Williams, A.

63 - Hanna

64 - Kennedy

65 - Curran

66 - Howard

67 - Colman

68 - Gabel

69 - Frisbie

70 - Partington

71 - Shannon

72 - Hudgens

73 - Travis

74 - Marzano

75 - Monroe

76 - Gardner

77 - Martin, L.

STRIKE-HOBO 50 - Ransom

51 - Johann

FF 10 - Williams, P.

~~11 - Solley~~

30 - Combs

31 - Preyss

HOBO 52 - Michaud

53 - Power

SPAD 13 - Detar

14 - Colman

HOBO 54 - Michaud

55 - Power

SPAD 15 - Detar

16 - Weinig

The A-1, Jolly Green and Nail forces who participated in the SAR effort on
7 December are as follows:

BANDY 01 - Monk	STRIKE FF 50 - Marzano
02 - Whinery	SMOKE 51 - Frisbie
03 - Novak	ZORRO 10 - Brown
04 - Driscoll	11 - Maloney
05 - Knox	FF 52 - Preyss
06 - Bertrand	53 - McAuliffe
07 - Dayton	HOBO 30 - Martin, L.
08 - Dyer	31 - Townsend
09 - Hudson	32 - Michaud
10 - Matthews	33 - Costin
11 - Lowman	ZORRO 12 - Martin, A.
12 - Wylie	13 - Cavender
J.G. 76 - Bell	FF 54 - George
77 - Shipman	55 - Chorlins
25 - Packer	56 - Walter
27 - Loomis	57 - Colman, T.
NAIL 19 - Hurt	SPAD 12 - Detar
24 - Barnard	13 - Colman
18 - Hellier	HOBO 24 - Doolittle
46 - Pierce	25 - Miller, W.
38 - Warden	FRUIT 40 - Homan
52 - Smith	41 - Manley
21 - White	42 - Andersen
	43 - Miller, G.
	44 - Poll
	45 - McNeil
	46 - Taenowski
	47 - Morrison
	48 - Williams, P.
	49 - Friestad
	50 - Diller
	51 - Solley
	52 - Williams, A.
	53 - Hanna
	54 - Kennedy
	55 - Curran

