

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

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ARCCO

Change to AFM 172-3 (HH-43) to Include Pararescue (A921XOB)

MAC (MAODC)

1. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service has an urgent operational requirement to identify an adequate aircrew capability of the HH-43B aircraft. An adequately trained and fully competent aircrew complement is not now reflected in AFM 172-3, Peace-Time Planning Factors Manual. This command is charged by AFR 23-19 with the responsibility to: "Plan, develop, and coordinate SAR/Air Recovery Force requirements for USAF, as directed; develop and maintain operational and equipment capabilities to meet SAR/Air Recovery requirements"; and, "maintain units in a state of readiness with a capability for rapid deployment." Pursuant to that mission directive, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service has consistently striven to identify and obtain an adequate force to discharge that responsibility. The critical deficiency that exists under the present aircrew manning concept for HH-43 aircraft has been repeatedly stressed.
2. The HH-43 cannot efficiently and capably perform its mission with the aircrew complement as designated in AFM 172-3. Further, the augmentation of HH-43 aircrews with personnel from local base resources is ineffective. Recognition of the need for HH-43 non-rated crew members in addition to the designated aircrew is found in AFR 55-18, where augmentation is required to provide an operationally ready LBR aircrew. This is in direct conflict with DAF doctrine as pertains to aircrew planning factors, since the aircraft is unable to perform its designated mission with the aircrew complement stipulated in AFM 172-3. Request recognition of established manpower expenditures and the identification of an available AFSC to make possible competent, professional, and efficient discharge of the LBR mission commitment. Specifically, to add, "Pararescue Technicians (A921XOB), two per aircrew", to the AFM 172-3 entries for HH-43B/F aircraft.
3. The Category II/III testing done by this command clearly demonstrated the critical need for professionally trained rescue crewmen aboard the HH-43 utilized in LBR operations. During the intervening years, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service has requested this change to reflect a complete aircrew in AFM 172-3. The most recent request was forwarded from this

headquarters, 7 January 1966. Various requests for action have been submitted through alternate channels such as the personnel action to relieve the critical CONUS/overseas imbalance in the pararescue (A921XOB) career field. This deficiency has been identified in the USAF Inspector General Management Inspection Report, March through May 1966, and the USAF Inspector General Capability Inspection Report, July through November 1964. These reports specifically identified the inadequate capability which exists as a result of insufficient training and qualification of USAF LBR non-rated aircrew members (901XO and 571XO). Major formal actions identifying this problem and requesting various methods of eliminating the deficiency have included:

a. The HH-43B Category II/III systems and Operational Evaluation Report (AFFTC-TR-60-21, (Reference TAB A, ARRS (ARODC) 2nd Ind.).

b. MAC letter (MACCO), 30 Apr 64, Air Rescue Service Local Base Rescue Unit Operations.

c. USAF Inspector General Capability Inspection Report, July through November 1964.

d. ARRS (ARODC) message, HH-43B Firefighter Training Course 102101, 12 January 1965.

e. ARRS (ARPCB) 10068 msg, HH-43B Firefighting Training for A571XO Personnel, November 1965.

f. ARRS (ARODC) letter, Authorization for Pararescue Personnel on HH-43 Helicopter Aircrew, 7 January 1966.

g. USAF Inspector General Management Inspection Report, 21 March through 31 May 1966.

h. ARRS (ARODC) letter, Authorization for Pararescue Personnel on HH-43 Helicopter Aircrew, 17 June 1966.

i. Hq ARRS (ARIIG) Indorsement, Report of Major Aircraft Accident F-100D, S/N 56-3357, 12 July 1966.

4. Discussion of the validity of the requirement for adequately qualified personnel is redundant in view of the above listed documentation. The validity of the requirement for pararescue personnel to be the specified non-rated-rescue helicopter crew members is established by the performance of pararescue personnel assigned to LBR/ACR units in Southeast Asia.

Additional understanding can be gained by review of the qualifications of the existing pararescue AFSC. The pararescueman is trained and qualified as the extension of the Airborne Rescue System. He is trained for one objective only - to save lives. His transportation, his tools, his methods are necessarily varied. Each disaster, and each survivor requires its own unique approach. The pararescueman is qualified to effect a rescue in any environment. Most importantly he is physiologically conditioned.

5. The pararescuemen, AFSC A921XOB, are the only qualified personnel available to logically correct the deficiency currently prevailing in the HH-43 aircrew structure. Training personnel from other AFSCs to adequately perform these duties, would require a duplication of the pararescueman's training. In contrast, three to five days additional qualification training would be required for pararescue personnel to perform LBR duties. The training would cover protective clothing, operation of the fire suppression equipment, and fire suppression techniques for crash access; training that provides another tool for the pararescueman to accomplish his basic mission. It does not retrain him into a separate field.

6. It has been stated that manpower allocations are not available to effect an AFM 172-3 change. Manpower availability is a function of operational priorities. It would appear that the priority made mandatory by the documentation in paragraph 3, in particular paragraph 3b, would be sufficient to warrant validation of the necessary manpower allocations. It has further been stated that no non-rated (excluding flight engineers) manpower allocations are now justified for the support of LBR flight operations, and therefore, are not available for conversion to A921XOB spaces to satisfy the AFM 172-3 change. The absence of validated allocations is fallacious rationale in this case since Air Force regulations and established priorities require a manhour expenditure as HH-43 aircrew members. Operations under AFR 55-18 require performance of duty by two firefighters and one aeromedical technician. The manhours are therefore required and expended in support of LBR operations. Recognition of this manpower expenditure would be in consonance with DAF manpower doctrine and serve to identify allocations which should be converted to satisfy this change to AFM 172-3.

7. The F-100, S/N 56-3357, accident in July 1966, vividly describes the incompatibility of using host base firefighters, and aeromedical specialists in LBR units. The mission of ARRS - to search, locate, and recover aircrew members from all types of terrain and environments, day or night, requires a continuous training program utilizing the most highly trained personnel available. The utilization of host base firefighters and aeromedical specialists has not afforded the LBRs with the trained personnel required to

perform the vital life saving mission. Their basic professional training is inadequate in scope to provide a professional rescue force. Some of the difficulties encountered by LBRs in training host base firefighters were recognized by the USAF Inspector General during the inspection of this command in 1965. The same problem exists today and was again identified by the Inspector General in March 1966. It must be noted that similar problems are encountered in using host base aeromedical specialists. Recommendation No. 3, TAB H, AF Form 711g, from the F-100D (S/N 56-3357) accident report, is restated below:

"that the rescue training of crews include:

"a. Sea survival.

"b. Complete familiarity with pilot survival gear, parachute release, and pilot's personal equipment.

"c. More specialized training to enable crews to enter water, retrieve pilot, and be able to remain in the water until return of a rescue unit."

This command currently possesses pararescue technicians (A921XOB), that have all the professional qualifications stated above: however, Hq ARRS has been denied approval to assign these highly qualified personnel to CONUS LBRs. Assignment of pararescue technicians to combat aircrew recovery units in Southeast Asia, has been extremely successful as is graphically born out in mission reports.

8. It would appear that two courses of action are available:

a. To accept the presently reduced mission capability and doctrinal inconsistency as justified, in view of manpower austerity, or

b. To make manpower available to correct existing deficiencies.

SIGNED

/s/

ALLISON C. BROOKS, Colonel, USAF
Commander